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Comment
The Pennsylvania Public Trust Doctrine: Its Use as
a Restraint on Government
The public trust theory of natural resource management was es-
tablished as the law of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania in 1971,
with the adoption of article I, section 27 of the Constitution of Penn-
sylvania.' This section declares that certain environmental rights
belong to the citizens of Pennsylvania, and imposes upon the Com-
monwealth, as trustee, the duty to conserve and maintain the public
natural resources for the benefit of the people.2
The public trust doctrine was a part of the body of common law
in Pennsylvania prior to the adoption of article I, § 27; however, the
common law public trust doctrine applied exclusively to waterways
of the Commonwealth and the submerged land thereunder.' The
constitutional public trust doctrine applies to all of the public natu-
ral resources of the Commonwealth.
It is the premise of this comment that the constitutional amend-
ment is more than a general statement of environmental policy; it
is a declaration of substantive rights in the people and an establish-
ment of an active trust. The scope of the discussion will be limited
to the public trust doctrine in Pennsylvania. The doctrine as it
exists at common law will be presented for its dependent signifi-
cance to the development of the constitutional public trust doctrine.
1. PA. CONST. art. I, § 27 reads as follows:
Article I: Declaration of Rights
That the general, great and essential principles of liberty and free government may
be recognized and unalterably established, WE DECLARE THAT-. . . . § 27: Natu-
ral resources and the public estate. The people have a right to clean air, pure water,
and to the preservation of the natural, scenic, historic and esthetic values of the
environment. Pennsylvania's public natural resources are the common property of all
the people, including generations yet to come. As trustee of these resources, the Com-
monwealth shall conserve and maintain them for the benefit of all the people.
Actually, two amendments to article I were adopted, both numbered § 27, the other being
"Prohibition against denial or abridgment of equality of rights because of sex."
2. PA. CONST. art. I, § 27.
3. See text accompanying notes 5-8 infra.
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I. THE PENNSYLVANIA COMMON LAW PUBLIC TRUST DOCTRINE
A. Background
As with any trust, the common law public trust comprises the
trust res, property which is the subject matter of the trust; a trustee,
who holds legal title to the res; and a beneficiary or beneficiaries,
for whose benefit the res is held, and who have equitable rights in
the res.1 Under English common law all navigable waters and the
submerged lands thereunder were held by the Crown in its public
and regal character, as representative of the people; i.e., as the
sovereign. The Crown held this legal title in trust for the benefit of
the whole community to be freely used by all.5
After the revolution, the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania suc-
ceeded to these rights, adopting the public trust doctrine as part of
the common law of the Commonwealth.' The legal title to the res
vested in the sovereign, the collective body of all the people. The
citizens of the Commonwealth became the beneficiaries of the trust,
not as a collective body, but as individuals. As a result, each citizen
has a right enforceable in equity to use the res for his own benefit.
In adopting the common law public trust doctrine, Pennsylvania
made certain changes as to the terms of the trust. By English com-
mon law, the term "navigable waters" was defined by the ebb and
flow of the tide; thus, the sea, arms of the sea, and rivers where the
tide ebbed and flowed, and the submerged land thereunder were
subject to the trust. Pennsylvania adopted a "navigable in fact"
test, thereby adding the great rivers of the Commonwealth as sub-
jects of the trust.' The land between the high and low water marks
4. 1 G.G. BOGERT & G.T. BOGERT, THE LAW OF TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES § 1 (2d ed. 1965);
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 2(h) (1959).
5. Martin v. Lessee of Waddell, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 367 (1842). In England, the trust res
was considered incapable of private occupation, cultivation, or improvement. The uses of the
res were to be public in nature, for highways of navigation and commerce, and for fishing.
For extensive historical background of the common law public trust in England and its
adoption by the various states of the United States see Shively v. Bowlby, 152 U.S. 1 (1894).
6. Tinicum Fishing Co. v. Carter, 61 Pa. 21, 30 (1869).
7. Carson v. Blazer, 2 Binn. 475 (Pa. 1810). See also Conneaut Lake Ice Co. v. Quigley,
225 Pa. 605, 74 A. 648 (1909) (applying the "navigability in fact" test to lakes as well as
rivers); Flanagan v. City of Philadelphia, 42 Pa. 219 (1862); Barclay R.R. v. Ingham, 36 Pa.
194 (1860); Shrunk v. Schuyekill Navigation Co., 14 S. & R. 71 (Pa. 1826).
In Cleveland & Pgh. R.R. v. Pittsburgh Coal Co., 317 Pa. 395, 176 A. 7 (1935), the court
held that where a stream, which is non-navigable and therefore the private property of the
riparian owners, is flooded by a dam project and thereby made navigable, by operation of
law, it becomes the property of the Commonwealth. Presumably, by operation of law, it also
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of the tide belonged to the Crown as part of the res, in England; in
Pennsylvania the title to this land vested in the riparian owners,
subject to the right of navigation in the public.'
As beneficiaries, the public have equitable rights to use the res
for their own benefit. In England, the res could be used for the pur-
poses of navigation and fishing.' To these uses, Pennsylvania added
the right to use the res for manufacturing purposes, 0 for dredging,"
for gathering stones, for removing ice, for bathing, and for removing
water for domestic and farming purposes. 2 In sum, the citizens of
the Commonwealth have the right to use the res for all practical,
personal reasons.
B. Operation of the Pennsylvania Common Law Public Trust
The operation of the common law public trust doctrine involves
two inquiries. The first is to determine whether or not the property
involved in a dispute is part of the trust res, and hence subject to
the terms of the trust. The second inquiry is to determine whether,
if the property is subject to the trust, the equitable rights of the
beneficiaries have been improperly invaded.
The public trust doctrine recognizes a distinction between the
government's ownership of the res and the government's ownership
of other property. An interesting example of this distinction appears
in an opinion of the Attorney General, The Waters of Presque Isle
Bay. '3 The Commonwealth owned land on Presque Isle on the shore
of the bay, which was administered by the State Park and Harbor
becomes subject to the public trust. The court expressly left open the question of whether
this constitutes a "taking." See also Scanlon v. Iron City Sand & Gravel Co., 345 Pa. 535, 29
A.2d 82 (1942).
8. Shively v. Bowlby, 152 U.S. 1, 23 (1894).
9. Flanagan v. City of Philadelphia, 42 Pa. 219, 229 (1862).
10. See, e.g., City of Philadelphia v. Gilmartin, 71 Pa. 140 (1872).
11. E.g., McGrady-Rogers Co. v. Commonwealth, 43 Dauph. 275 (C.P. Pa. 1937).
12. Hunt v. Graham, 15 Pa. Super. 42, 46-47 (1900).
13. 12 Pa. D. & C. 88 (1928). In Illinois Cent. R.R. v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387 (1892), the
United States Supreme Court, in speaking of a grant by the state legislature to a private
company of the shorelands for a distance of one mile within the limits of Chicago, stated:
The character of the title or ownership by which the State holds the state house is quite
different from that by which it holds the land under the navigable waters in and around
its territory. . . . [The navigable waters are held by the state] in trust for the public
uses of navigation and fishery, and the erection thereon of wharves, piers, light-houses,
beacons, and other facilities of navigation and commerce. Being subject to this trust,
they were publicijuris; in other words, they were held for the use of the people at large.
Id. at 457.
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Commission of Erie. A request was made by the Commission to the
Attorney General for his opinion on the jurisdiction of the Commis-
sion in the land and the adjoining waters of the bay. Specifically,
the issue was whether or not private citizens had the right to use
those waters for the mooring of houseboats and boats used by duck
hunters, and for the anchoring of a grain fleet. It was the Attorney
General's opinion that the Commission had no jurisdiction to pre-
vent such use of the waters by citizens of the Commonwealth. He
stated that the Commonwealth held title to the shorelands in its
proprietary capacity, and had rights and duties in that land similar
to those of any corporate landowner. The nature of the Common-
wealth's ownership of the bed of the bay, however, was found to be
quite different. This title was held by the Commonwealth in its
sovereign capacity in trust for the use and enjoyment of the people.
The opinion stated that the legislature might make grants of the res
only if such grants recognized the public's rights in the trust. While
the Commission had the full power to keep others from coming upon
the land except on its terms, without specific legislative authority,
it had no power to exercise similar dominion over the waters.
The second component in the operation of the common law public
trust doctrine, once it is established that the trust res is involved,
is to determine whether the equitable rights of the beneficiaries
have been improperly invaded. The key question to be asked here
is whether, and to what extent, the doctrine constrains the Com-
monwealth, qua trustee, in its dealings with the trust res."1 In terms
of judicial review of government action dealing with the res, will the
court look only to whether or not due process has been satisfied, or
will it inquire further to see whether the res is being maintained for
the free and unrestrained use by the public? 5
14. See Sax, The Public Trust Doctrine in Natural Resource Law: Effective Judicial
Intervention, 68 MIcH. L. REv. 471 (1970) [hereinafter cited as Sax].
15. One commentator has raised the issue in this manner:
Whether and to what extent that trusteeship constrains the states in their dealings
with such lands has, however, been a subject of much controversy. If the trusteeship
puts such lands wholly beyond the police power of the state, making them inalienable
and unchangeable in use, then the public right is quite an extraordinary one . ...
Conversely, if the trust in American law implies nothing more than that state authority
must be exercised consistent [sic] with the general police power, then the trust im-
poses no restraint on government beyond that which is implicit in all judicial review
of state action-the challenged conduct, to be valid, must be exercised for a public
purpose. . ..
Id. at 476-77.
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A determination by the courts that the government should be
constrained in dealing with the res seems to be a function of two
factors: the extent to which the government action has infringed
upon certain of the public's identifiable equitable rights in the prop-
erty, and the particular branch or political subdivision of the gov-
ernment that has acted.
At the heart of the doctrine is the right of the people to use the
res for their own benefit."6 If a governmental action has the effect of
denying the public access to the res, the courts have held that it may
be void as a violation of the trust. An example of such an action
arose in the case of Reighard v. Flinn." The City of Pittsburgh was
authorized by the legislature to develop a public landing on the
Allegheny River, and was vested with authority to regulate and
control its use. To this end, the city leased the property to a private
company to erect and operate the landing. Suit was brought by
adjacent landowners to have the lease declared null and void and
to compel, on the grounds of public nuisance, the removal of the
buildings erected. The court stated that disposition of the case de-
pended solely on the issue of whether the city had a lawful right to
make the lease. The city's action was found to be in violation of the
public trust, and therefore was held to be unlawful. The court stated
that the public's right to use the landing as access to the river for
navigation must be totally unrestrained from regulation and control
by, or subject to the consent of private individuals. It was of no
consequence that the people would still have access to the landing
conditioned on the payment of a fee to the lessee. Such subservience
of the public's rights would be in violation of the public trust as an
16. For examples of these rights see text accompanying notes 9-12 supra.
17. 189 Pa. 355, 42 A. 23 (1899).
18. In Reighard v. Flinn, 194 Pa. 352, 44 A. 1080 (1900), the court allowed the city to
maintain and use the structures built under the lease according to a new scheme which was
consistent with the rights of the public as beneficiaries of the public trust. It was made clear
that the erection of buildings for the improvement of the landing for docking purposes was
not inconsistent with the terms of the trust. It was also reasonable to charge a fee reasonably
related to such improvements. The two decisions, taken together, show that it is not the
erection of buildings, or the charging of a fee, which is a per se violation of the trust; rather,
it is the abdication of the duties of the trustee by placing the res in the control of private
individuals, that constitutes such a violation. In Flanagan v. City of Philadelphia, 42 Pa. 219
(1862), the court said:
There is no natural right of the citizen, except the personal rights of life and liberty,
which is paramount to his right to navigate freely the navigable streams of the country
he inhabits. It ranks immediately after those great personal rights.
Id. at 228.
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impermissible delegation of the duties of the trustee. The lease was
declared void and the structures were ordered to be removed. 8
The court will not interfere with a profitable governmental use of
the res unrelated to the trust where it feels that the public's right
to enjoy such res has not been impaired. In James Rees & Sons v.
Pittsburgh,9 the court held that it was permissible for the city to
use a public wharf on the Allegheny River for a public parking lot.
The court stated that in Reighard the right of the public to use the
wharf in connection with navigation was superior to the city's right
to adopt the wharf as a parking lot; but it found that in this case,
the superior right of the beneficiaries had not been violated because
suitable and adequate space for docking was otherwise available.
From these two cases, it can be seen that the court will only strike
down a governmental action as violative of the trust when a specific
right of the public has been violated. A governmental use need not
enhance the rights of the beneficiaries, but it must not diminish
them.
The court will also consider which branch or political subdivision
of the government has acted. It has been suggested that the primary
function of the doctrine is one of democratizing the government
processes as they relate to our natural resources.20 The problem is
most acute at the level of "low-visibility" decision-making in ad-
ministrative agencies. Here, the inherent inequality of access to and
influence over the government decision-making process is the great-
est.2 '
Massachusetts has applied the public trust doctrine in an at-
tempt to bring the decision-making process out into the open where
it can be more responsive to the political process. The Massachu-
setts rule, by what has been characterized as "a simple but inge-
neous flick of the doctrinal wrist,. ..,,2 states that any change in
the use of public lands, or any governmental action which tends to
lessen the public uses of them, is impermissible without a clear
showing of legislative approval.13 Such approval is defined so as to
require specific legislative identification of the property, a state-
19. 316 Pa. 356, 175 A. 420 (1934).
20. Sax, supra note 14, at 561.
21. Id. at 498.
22. Id.
23. Gould v. Greylock Reservation Comm'n, 350 Mass. 410, 215 N.E.2d 114 (1966). The
court found a "presumption" that the state does not ordinarily intend to lessen public uses.
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ment of the new use, and a showing of the willingness to surrender
the existing use.24 This rule requires the administrative agency, or
the party seeking to change the use of public lands, to make a
positive case to the legislature.
The Pennsylvania common law doctrine, in a more general way,
also seems to require legislative approval if the public's right to use
the res is to be compromised. In terms of the extent to which the
doctrine is a constraint on government action dealing with the res,
administrative agencies and local governmental bodies would seem
to be severely constrained if their actions infringe upon the public's
rights. In 1939, for example, the Secretary of Property and Supplies
notified companies conducting dredging operations in the rivers of
Pennsylvania that they would be required to apply for a permit and
pay a fee to the Water and Power Resources Board for such a privi-
lege. A suit was brought to enjoin the Commonwealth from enforc-
ing this order, and the injunction was issued.25 The court held that
the title to the river beds was in the Commonwealth, but that the
public trust required specific legislation to deny the public the right
to conduct dredging operations as they had been doing for years. 2
The Commonwealth, when acting through the legislature, is sub-
stantially less restrained by the trust doctrine than when acting
through administrative agencies. The courts have said that the pub-
lic trust doctrine is a common law principle that can be overridden
by legislative action. In Flanagan v. City of Philadelphia,2 suit was
brought to enjoin the building of a bridge by the city over the
Schuylkill River because of its adverse affect on the navigation of
the river. The legislature had specifically approved the project. In
denying the injunction, the court held that as important as the right
to navigation is, it may be impaired by the legislature because it
enjoys no constitutional guaranty. 8 The legislature has the author-
ity to determine that the public convenience requires a partial re-
straint on the rights of the beneficiaries of the trust.
The aspect of the public trust doctrine which prevents the govern-
24. Robbins v. Department of Pub. Works, 355 Mass. 328, 244 N.E.2d 577 (1969).
25. McGrady-Rogers Co. v. Commonwealth, 43 Dauph. 275 (C.P. Pa. 1937).
26. For an example of the same principle relating to local governmental bodies see text
accompanying notes 16-18 supra. In Reighard, the court specifically left open the question of
whether Pittsburgh could have leased the wharf to private citizens if the state legislature had
given specific approval for such action.
27. 42 Pa. 219 (1862).
28. Id. at 230.
1975
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ment from irrevocably conveying the corpus to private individuals
appears to apply to the legislature as well as to other branches of
government, at least to the extent that they divert the res from the
proper uses by the public. If such a grant were made by the legisla-
ture, the grant would be revocable, notwithstanding language in the
grant itself to the contrary. 9 This does not mean that the Common-
wealth cannot make incidental grants which would improve the
facility, so long as they do not substantially impair the public inter-
est in the use of the res.0
H. THE PENNSYLVANIA CONSTITUTIONAL PUBLIC TRUST DOCTRINE
A. Scope of the Trust
Under the Pennsylvania common law public trust doctrine, the
Commonwealth holds the legal title to the navigable waterways
subject to certain equitable rights of the citizens to use the res for
their own benefit, i.e., the common law trust exists primarily to
insure the public's access to the navigable waterways of Pennsyl-
vania. 3' The Pennsylvania declaration of environmental rights
amendment declares that all of the public natural resources of the
Commonwealth shall be held subject to a public trust, thereby pro-
tecting all such resources from abuse by the government or the
public itself.31
Although the general purpose of the amendment is clear, the
exact constitutional language employed gives rise to various concep-
tualizations of the trust:
§ 27: Natural resources and the public estate. The people have
a right to clean air, pure water, and to the preservation of the
natural, scenic, historic and esthetic values of the environ-
ment. Pennsylvania's public natural resources are the common
property of all the people, including generations yet to come.
As trustee of these resources, the Commonwealth shall con-
serve and maintain them for the benefit of all the people.
29. Although this exact determination has never been made by a Pennsylvania court, the
proposition has been generally accepted. See Illinois Cent. R.R. v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387
(1892).
30. See note 26 supra.
31. See, e.g., McGrady-Rogers Co. v. Commonwealth, 43 Dauph. 275 (C.P. Pa. 1937).
32. PA. CONST. art. I, § 27. There is some overlap between the two trusts. The navigable
waterways continue to be subject to the common law public trust, but, as a public natural
resource, also become a part of the res of the constitutional public trust.
33. Id.
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One such conceptualization of the amendment was characterized
by Chief Justice Jones, dissenting in Commonwealth v. National
Gettysburg Battlefield Towers, Inc. 31 The Chief Justice saw all three
sentences of the amendment as defining the trust. The amendment
"confers certain enumerated rights upon the people . . .and im-
poses upon the executive branch a fiduciary obligation to protect
and enforce those rights."35 The trust res was conceptualized as the
"natural, scenic, historic and aesthetic values of the environment;"
the Commonwealth, through its executive branch, as the trustee;
and the people of the Commonwealth, as the beneficiaries. He also
stated that the amendment raised the common law trust doctrine
to a constitutionally protected level and bestowed upon the trust
beneficiaries general "constitutional right[s] to environmental pro-
tection. "3
Although Chief Justice Jones seemed to consider the common law
public trust doctrine in his analysis, it is generally unclear whether
it has merged into the constitutional public trust or operates inde-
pendently. In either case, the legal principles which were judicially
developed to handle the trust at common law would seem to be
relevant in administering the constitutional trust. At common law,
the actions of the trustee in dealing with the res were inhibited only
to the extent that they infringed upon judicially recognized equita-
ble rights of the beneficiaries. Extending this principle to the consti-
tutional trust, then, the first sentence of the amendment would
indicate an intention to declare these enumerated rights as the equi-
table rights of the beneficiaries rather than to define such rights on
a case-by-case basis.
Moreover, Chief Justice Jones' conclusion that the "natural, sce-
nic, historic, and aesthetic values of the environment" constitute
the trust res seems to contradict the wording of the amendment
itself. That phrase, as part of the first sentence, appears to be a
statement of the rights of the people, and not a declaration of the
res. To define the res as a set of values, rather than as definite
property or property interests, can only add confusion. The concept
of a set of enumerated values suggests a subjective judgment, but a
determination of whether a government decision relates to the res
should be an objective decision. Values should come into play only
34. 454 Pa. 193, 208, 311 A.2d 588, 595 (1973).
35. Id. at 209, 311 A.2d at 596.
36. Id., 311 A.2d at 596.
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in determining whether a governmental action adversely affects the
rights of the beneficiaries in a manner violative of the trust.
One commentator has suggested that the res should encompass
all of Pennsylvania's public natural resources, however defined at
the time." Such a conceptualization seems logical, since the legisla-
ture rejected a listing of the resources which comprise the res, in
favor of leaving the category open. To replace the deleted list with
this list found in the first sentence would seem contrary to the
legislative intent. This view of the res appears most workable. By
not being tied to the enumerated list of rights in the amendment's
first sentence, the concept of the res is allowed to expand or contract
as contemporary notions of property change. Moreover, the stated
rights then remain available as an enumeration of the rights of the
beneficiaries in the constitutional trust.
B. Implementation of the Trust
1. Powers and Duties of the State as Trustee
Having determined the scope of the trust res and the extent of the
beneficiaries' interests therein, it becomes important to explore the
powers and duties of the Commonwealth to deal with the natural
resources concomitant with its role as trustee. Regarding the power
of the Commonwealth to regulate the use of land, the Constitutional
trust doctrine reaffirms the police power to establish standards for
the public health. It also establishes new powers to regulate the use
of land with aesthetic and historic considerations in mind. 8 These
new powers, at the time of this writing, have not been implemented
by the legislature; however, the obligations imposed by the trust
which limit the powers of the trustee to act, where such acts affect
the res, are being enforced.
The language of the amendment imposes the duty upon the Com-
monwealth, as trustee, to conserve and maintain the public natural
resources for the benefit of the people. The Pennsylvania Common-
wealth Court has rejected the strict view that this imposes a duty
to refrain from any action which might result in some degree of
37. Broughton, The Proposed Pennsylvania Declaration of Environmental Rights, Analy-
sis of H. B. 958, 41 PA. B. Ass'N Q. 421, 422 (1970).
38. Commonwealth v. National Gettysburg Battlefield Tower, Inc., 454 Pa. 193, 200-01,
311 A.2d 588, 592 (1973).
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environmental harm. 9 Rather the amendment has been held to re-
quire that decision-makers consider environmental factors and
weigh them against potentially conflicting social concerns before
determining a course of action.4" The court's role in reviewing such
decisions is to insure that these factors are adequately considered.
In the case of Payne v. Kassab,4 the commonwealth court an-
nounced that the standard for review of governmental decisions
relating to the administration of the trust involves the following
questions:
1. Was there compliance with all applicable statutes and regu-
lations relevant to the protection of the Commonwealth's public
natural resources?
2. Does the record demonstrate a reasonable effort to reduce
environmental incursion to a minimum?
3. Does the environmental harm which will result from the chal-
lenged decision or action so clearly outweigh the benefits to be
derived therefrom that to proceed further would be an abuse of
discretion?42
Payne dealt with a suit by citizens against the Pennsylvania De-
partment of Transportation to enjoin the use of a portion of a public
park for highway expansion. The plaintiffs contended that this
39. Payne v. Kassab, 11 Pa. Commw. 14, 29, 312 A.2d 86, 94 (1973). See also Common-
wealth v. National Gettysburg Battlefield Tower, Inc., 8 Pa. Commw. 231, 249, 302 A.2d 886,
895 (1973).
40. Commonwealth v. National Gettysburg Battlefield Tower, Inc., 8 Pa. Commw. 231,
249, 302 A.2d 886, 895 (1973).
41. 11 Pa. Commw. 14, 312 A.2d 86 (1973).
42. Id. at 29-30, 312 A.2d at 94. Compare Camp Hill Borough Condemnation, 43 Pa. D.
& C.2d 418 (C.P. Cumberland Co. 1967), which was decided prior to the adoption of PA.
CONST. art. I, § 27, and prior to the passage of PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 71, § 512(b) (Supp. 1974)
(see note 43 infra and accompanying text). The court heard a challenge to the condemnation
of a borough park for highway construction; it said that in order to subject the Department
of Transportation to restraint by the courts, it must be shown that its actions were fraudulent,
arbitrary or capricious.
If the testimony produced by the borough is accepted in all respects, it would seem
that the Highway Department officials may have made a mistake in their judgment
as to the site for the bridge. This, however, is insufficient to set aside their decision
.... We cannot find from the testimony presented that the action of the secretary
has been based on his will rather than upon the exercise of his judgment. It is, there-
fore, not arbitrary. Likewise, although the decision may have been erroneous, it was
not freakish or whimsical, and it was, therefore, not capricious.
43 Pa. D. & C.2d at 426.
For the general rule, absent application of the constitutional public trust, for the scope of
judicial review of decisions made by authorities, administrative agencies, or local governmen-
1975
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would be an improper use of the res by the trustee. The standard
announced by the court actually had little impact on the result of
this particular suit since in undertaking the design of any new trans-
portation route or program requiring the acquisition of a new or
additional right-of-way, the Department of Transportation is re-
quired by statute to prepare environmental impact statements and
hold public hearings to consider, among other things, various envi-
ronmental factors . 3 Indeed, the statutory requirements in this case
were at least as strict as the requirements imposed by the trust.
tal bodies see Blumenschein v. Pittsburgh Housing Authority, 379 Pa. 566, 109 A.2d 331
(1954):
[The] Courts will not review the actions of government bodies or administrative
tribunals involving acts of discretion in the absence of bad faith, fraud, capricious
action or abuse of power; they will not inquire into the wisdom of such actions or into
the details of the manner adopted to carry them into execution.
Id. at 572-73, 109 A.2d at 335. See also Price v. Philadelphia Parking Authority, 422 Pa. 317,
221 A.2d 138 (1966); Schwartz v. Urban Redevelopment Authority, 416 Pa. 503, 206 A.2d 789
(1965); Keystone Raceway Corp. v. State Harness Racing Comm'n, 405 Pa. 1, 173 A.2d 97
(1961); Eways v. Reading Parkway Authority, 385 Pa. 592, 124 A.2d 92 (1956); Schenck v.
City of Pittsburgh, 364 Pa. 31, 70 A.2d 612 (1950); Floersheim Appeal, 348 Pa. 98, 34 A.2d 62
(1943); City of Pittsburgh v. Milk Marketing Bd., 1 Pa. Commw. 300, 275 A.2d 115 (1971);
Redevelopment Authority v. Owners or Parties in Interest, 1 Pa. Commw. 378, 274 A.2d 244
(1971).
43. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 71, § 512 (b) (Supp. 1974).
Upon the submission of the preliminary plan or design to the Department of
Transportation for any transportation route or program requiring the acquisition of
new or additional right-of-way, the Department of Transportation except in cases
involving complaint proceedings under the jurisdiction of the Public Utility Commis-
sion shall have the power and its duty shall be to follow the hearing procedures now
or hereafter required by the Federal Government for Federal-aid transportation pro-
grams pursuant to Titles 23 and 49 of the United States Code as amended and the
regulations and procedures thereunder even though the transportation route or pro-
gram does not contemplate the use of or actually employ Federal funds. At the hearings
required by this subsection the Department of Transportation shall consider the fol-
lowing effects of the transportation route or program:
(1) Residential and neighborhood character and location;
(2) Conservation including air, erosion, sedimentation, wildlife and general
ecology of the area;
(3) Noise, and air and water pollution;
(4) Multiple use of space;
(5) Replacement housing;
(6) Displacement of families and businesses;
(7) Recreation and parks;
(8) Aesthetics;
(9) Public health and safety;
(10) Fast, safe and efficient transportation;
(11) Civil defense;
(12) Economic activity;
(13) Employment;
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The importance of the three-fold Payne standard, however, tran-
scends the facts of that case since the same standard of review has
been held appropriate in cases involving the public trust res, not-
withstanding the absence of any statutory requirement that en-
vironmental factors be considered.4 For instance, that test has
been employed by the commonwealth court to review a challenged
decision of the Public Utility Commission to issue a certificate of
public convenience,"5 and by the Environmental Hearing Board,
(14) Fire protection;
(15) Public utilities;
(16) Religious institutions;
(17) Conduct and financing of government including the effect on the local tax
base and social service costs;
(18) Natural and historic landmarks;
(19) Property values;
(20) Education, including the disruption of school district operations;
(21) Engineering, right-of-way and construction costs of the project and re-
lated facilities;
(22) Maintenance and operating costs of the project and related facilities;
(23) Operation and use of existing transportation routes and programs during
construction and after completion.
At the hearings required by this section, the public officials named in clause (15) of
subsection (a) of this section shall make a report indicating the environmental effects
of the proposed transportation route or program. The Department of Transportation
shall not construct or reconstruct any portion of the transportation route or program
unless the Secretary of Transportation makes a written finding published in the Penn-
sylvania Bulletin that;
(1) No adverse environmental effect is likely to result from such transportation
route or program; or
(2) There exists no feasible and prudent alternative to such effect and all
reasonable steps have been taken to minimize such effect. For the purpose of
this subsection environmental effect shall refer to the effects enumerated in this
subsection.
44. In deciding a case prior to the decision in Payne, the Court of Common Pleas of Bucks
County had held that the failure of a municipal water authority to consider the environmental
factors of a decision for the location of a well and storage tower would be, in light of PA. CONST.
art. I, § 27, a capricious and arbitrary act. Flowers v. Northampton Bucks County Municipal
Authority, 57 Pa. D. & C.2d 274, 279 (C.P. Bucks Co. 1971). Presumably now, where a
municipal authority makes decisions affecting the res, the three-fold standard of Payne will
be applied.
45. Bucks County Bd. of Comm'rs v. Public Util. Comm'n, 11 Pa. Commw. 487, 313 A.2d
185 (1973). The court held that the three-fold Payne test supplemented the statutory scope
of review for any appeal from an order of the commission. The following are the pertinent
statutory provisions governing the scope of review of commission determinations. PA. STAT.
ANN. tit. 66, § 1437 (1959):
Any appeal . . . shall be determined upon the record certified by the commission
to the court. . . . The order of the commission shall not be vacated or set aside . ..
except for error of law or lack of evidence to support the finding, determination, or
order of the commission, or violation of constitutional rights.
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the quasi-judicial arm of the Pennsylvania Department of Environ-
mental Resources, to review decisions of the Department to issue
various permits under the authority of the Clean Streams Law"
and/or the Sewage Facilities Act.47
The first inquiry under the Payne test, to see whether there has
been compliance with applicable statutes and regulations relevant
to the res, adds little to the substantive body of law dealing with
review of governmental action. Once a question is before the court,
statutes and regulations relevant to the issue have always been pro-
per subjects for judicial inquiry. Holding that such compliance is
constitutionally required by the public trust doctrine, however,
could have important implications in considering the standing of a
particular plaintiff to challenge the government action at issue. To
the extent that the requirements of standing under the public trust
doctrine are held to be less restrictive than those necessary to chal-
lenge government action under a statute or regulation claimed by
plaintiff to have been violated, the concept of standing may be
expanded in some cases where environmental damage is at issue.
The Payne standard also requires the court to determine whether
the environmental harm so clearly outweighs the social benefits of
the action that it would be an abuse of discretion to proceed. This
indicates that one of the traditional techniques of judicial review of
governmental action-inquiry into whether there has been an abuse
of discretion-will be applied in public trust cases. Failure to give
adequate consideration to the environmental factors may be found
to be such an abuse of discretion.
PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 66, § 1442 (Supp. 1974):
Whenever the commission shall make any rule, regulation, finding, determination,
or order, under the provisions of this act, the same shall be prima facie evidence of
the facts found ....
In applying the statutory scope of judicial review, the court is bound by the substantial
evidence test. See Modem Transfer Co. v. Public Util. Comm'n, 182 Pa. Super. 110, 125 A.2d
463 (1956). "Substantial evidence is such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind can accept
as adequate to support a conclusion .... " Bucks County Bd. of Comm'rs v. Public Util.
Comm'n, 11 Pa. Commw. 487, 493, 313 A.2d 185, 190 (1973). See generally Pittsburgh Rys.
v. Public Util. Comm'n, 198 Pa. Super. 415, 182 A.2d. 80 (1962); Johnstown-Pittsburgh
Express, Inc. v. Public Util. Comm'n, 5 Pa. Commw. 521, 291 A.2d 545 (1972); Erie L. Ry.
v. Public Util. Comm'n, 2 Pa. Commw. 396, 278 A.2d 188 (1971).
46. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 35, §§ 691.1-.801 (1964).
47. Id. §§ 750.1-.15 (Supp. 1974). See, e.g., Fox Appeal, No. 73-078-B (Pa. Environmental
Hearing Bd. May 16, 1974). See also In re S & F Builders, Inc., 60 Pa. D. & C.2d 115 (Pa.
Environmental Hearing Bd. 1971) (the amendment was found to be relevant, in an appeal
from a denial of a permit to change the course of a stream, to the interpretation and applica-
tion of the Water Obstructions Act, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 32, §§ 681-91 (1967)).
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Finally, the court must determine whether the record demon-
strates a reasonable effort to reduce environmental incursion to a
minimum. This determination has potentially the most far-reaching
impact on government action dealing with the res, for it requires
that the government, as trustee, actively consider and weigh the
environmental factors involved when dealing with the res. This
raises a question as to which record the court will look for a demon-
stration of this reasonable effort.
In the Payne case itself, this was not a problem. The public hear-
ings required by statute to be held by the Department of Transpor-
tation created the public record which was scrutinized by the court.
In other situations, however, such hearings and studies will not be
statutorily required. For instance, the Department of Transporta-
tion must hold hearings and undertake environmental impact stud-
ies only if the scope of the project is such that it will be considered
a "transportation route or program."' 8 In smaller projects, where no
hearing is required,4" it is unclear to what record the court will look
for review under the Payne analysis.w
If no public record were established, it would seem that some
other type of inquiry would have to be made to determine if environ-
mental damage has been kept to a minimum. The court could estab-
lish its own record by studying the matter de novo, but this would
create the logical inconsistency of creating a broader scope of review
in these instances than in cases where the legislature has required
the agency itself to establish a record. An alternative position would
be to hold that the constitutional public trust doctrine itself requires
that where there is a possibility of environmental damage resulting
from a governmental decision, the agency involved must establish
a public record adequate for the court to be able to determine how
the particular decision was reached.
2. The Self-Execution Issue
One last issue remains to be discussed-whether the constitu-
tional amendment standing alone confers trust duties upon the
Commonwealth, i.e., are the amendment's provisions self-
executing? To the extent that the provisions are not deemed to be
48. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 71, § 512 (b) (Supp. 1974), the text of which appears in note 43
supra.
49. See Cowell v. Commonwealth, 6 Pa. Commw. 974, 297 A.2d 529 (1972).
50. Cf. Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402 (1971).
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self-executing supplementary legislative action is required.5 To
shed light on this issue the amendment must be further explored.
The general rule is that the sections of the constitution contained
in article I are self-executing to the extent that they limit the powers
of government.5 2 The constitutional public trust doctrine presents a
unique situation in that it both limits and expands the powers of
the government. The amendment imposes certain obligations upon
the trustee that limit its activities if they would have an adverse
affect upon the trust.53 On the other hand, the amendment expands
the powers of the government to regulate a use of land that affects
the natural resources. It therefore becomes difficult to make a gen-
eral statement concerning the self-execution of the amendment's
provisions since the resolution may depend upon whether a particu-
lar application expands or limits the trustee's powers.
An example of an attempted use of these expanded powers by the
executive branch, without any legislative implementation, is con-
tained in Commonwealth v. National Gettysburg Battlefield Tower,
Inc. " The Commonwealth, by the Governor and the Attorney Gen-
eral, brought suit to enjoin the construction of an observation tower
near the Gettysburg battlefield. At issue was the potential damage
to the historic and environmental value of the battlefield.
51. 1 T. COOLEY, CONsTrrurIONAL LIMITATION 165 (8th ed. 1927).
But although none of the provisions of a constitution are to be looked upon as
immaterial or merely advisory, there are some which, from the nature of the case, are
as incapable of compulsory enforcement as are directory provisions in general. The
reason is that, while the purpose may be to establish rights or to impose duties, they
do not in and of themselves constitute a sufficient rule by means of which such right
may be protected or such duty enforced. In such cases, before the constitutional provi-
sion can be made effectual, supplemental legislation must be had; and the provision
may be in its nature mandatory to the legislature to enact the needful legislation,
though back of it there lies no authority to enforce the command. Sometimes the
constitution in terms requires the legislature to enact laws on a particular subject; and
here it is obvious that the requirement has only a moral force: the legislature ought to
obey it; but the right intended to be given is only assured when the legislation is
voluntarily enacted.
Id. (footnotes omitted), quoted in Commonwealth v. National Gettysburg Battlefield Tower,
Inc., 454 Pa. 193, 198-99, 311 A.2d 588, 591 (1973).
52. Justice O'Brien recognized this general rule as being established in article I, § 25 of
the state constitution:
Reservation of Powers in People:
To guard against transgressions of the high powers which we have delegated, we de-
clare that everything in this article is excepted out of the general powers of the govern-
ment and shall forever remain inviolate.
PA. CONST. art. I, § 25.
53. See, e.g., Payne v. Kassab, 11 Pa. Commw. 14, 312 A.2d 86 (1973).
54. 454 Pa. 193, 311 A.2d 588 (1973).
1975 Comment
At trial, the chancellor found that the amendment was self-
executing for this purpose, but denied the injunction on the merits.5
On appeal the commonwealth court affirmed both the decision and
the resolution of the self-execution issue.56 The Supreme Court of
Pennsylvania also affirmed, but it is unclear whether the court held
the provisions of the amendment to be self-executing for this pur-
pose since no opinion commanded a majority of the court.57
Justice O'Brien stated that the provisions of the amendment, as
they were at issue in this case, are not self-executing.5 The Com-
monwealth was attempting to use the constitutional public trust to
expand its powers into areas where it previously had no authority
to act. This, Justice O'Brien said, it could not do without legislative
authority.
The issue of self-execution in this case actually presented the
question of which governmental branches were vested with the pow-
ers of the trustee. Specifically, the court had to decide if the execu-
tive branch could, without implementing legislation, protect the res
from potential damage by individuals. Justice O'Brien's opinion
indicates a belief that this power vests in the legislative branch
exclusively, and cannot be exercised by the executive unless author-
ized by the legislature. This position is consistent with the principle
55. Commonwealth v. National Gettysburg Battlefield Tower, Inc., 13 Adams 75 (C.P.
Pa. 1971).
56. Commonwealth v. National Gettysburg Battlefield Tower, Inc., 8 Pa. Commw. 231,
302 A.2d 886 (1973).
57. The case was heard before the seven member court; Justice O'Brien, announcing the
decision of the court, held that the provisions in question were not self-executing for this
purpose. Justice Nix, without opinion, concurred in the result. 454 Pa. at 206, 311 A.2d at
595. Justice Roberts, in a concurring opinion in which Justice Manderino joined, found that
the chancellor had ruled properly on the merits. Although he did not expressly address the
"self-execution" issue, he did state that he had "serious reservations as to the propriety of
granting the requested relief in this case in the absence of appropriate and articulated sub-
stantive and procedural standards." Id. at 208, 311 A.2d at 596. He did not explain whether
these standards must come from the legislature, or whether the executive branch, through
appropriate administrative agencies, could promulgate such regulations. Chief Justice Jones
filed a dissent, in which Justice Eagen joined, stating that the amendment should be held
self-executing. Id. at 208-15, 311 A.2d at 596-99.
In Commonwealth v. Abington Township Zoning Hearing Bd., No. 72-12524, at 13 (C.P.
Montgomery Co., Pa., filed Sept. 30, 1974), the court held that the amendment was self-
executing and enforceable by the Attorney General of the Commonwealth under circum-
stances similar to Gettysburg. The court stated that the Pennsylvania Supreme Court in
Gettysburg had not definitively ruled on this issue. Id. at n.2. Therefore the court considered
itself bound by the decision of the commonwealth court, the highest court in the state to
definitively rule on the matter, that the amendment was self-executing for this purpose.
58. 454 Pa. at 199-200, 311 A.2d at 592.
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established under the common law public trust doctrine that the
legislature, not the executive, is empowered to exercise the discre-
tion vested in the trustee.59
Even if Justice O'Brien's position were to be adopted by a major-
ity of the court, its impact would merely be to state that the amend-
ment is not self-executing where it is used to expand the powers of
the government. This position, however, does not undermine the
general rule declaring the provisions of article I to be self-executing.
Indeed, the commonwealth court has held that the limiting aspects
of the amendment fall within that general rule.A0
C. Enforcement of the Trust-Standing
In order to raise the issue of whether an action of the trustee
relating to the res violates the duties of the trustee, a party must
demonstrate to the court that he is a proper party to bring an action
for judicial review of the decision in question. In most situations, the
challenged decision will have been made by a state administrative
agency, and administrative law will then provide the framework for
affected members of the public to challenge these actions as uncon-
stitutional, unlawful, arbitrary and capricious, or abusive of discre-
tion. A complete treatment of the subject of standing to challenge
administrative decision-making is beyond the scope of this com-
ment; therefore, the treatment of the issue here will be limited to a
brief discussion of several of the theories which have been suggested
as being appropriate when the claim is based on the public trust
doctrine.
Whether a violation of a citizen's rights as beneficiary of the trust
is sufficient by itself to accord standing to challenge governmental
action has not yet been decided by the courts. In Payne v. Kassab,"1
a taxpayer's suit by members of the community who used the park,
the court did not explain the basis for according standing to the
plaintiffs to raise the issues involved. Generally, if a public project
of this type is financed with state tax dollars from a fund into which
a Pennsylvania citizen has paid taxes, that citizen has standing to
59. See, e.g., McGrady-Rogers Co. v. Commonwealth, 43 Dauph. 275 (C.P. Pa. 1937).
60. Only the commonwealth court has thus far ruled on these limiting aspects. Common-
wealth v. National Gettysburg Battlefield Tower, Inc., 8 Pa. Commw. 231, 302 A.2d 886
(1973). See also Bucks County Bd. of Comm'rs v. Public Util. Comm'n, 11 Pa. Commw. 487,
313 A.2d 185 (1973); Payne v. Kassab, 11 Pa. Commw. 14, 312 A.2d 86 (1973).
61. 11 Pa. Commw. 14, 312 A.2d 86 (1973).
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challenge the legality of the project by means of a taxpayer's suit.2
It has been stated that the public is given standing to maintain
taxpayers' suits in order to provide a means of "mobilizing the self-
interest of individuals with the body politic to prevent illegal and
unwarranted governmental action."" Similarly, it has been sug-
gested that one of the primary purposes of a public trust doctrine
62. In order to maintain a taxpayer suit to seek injunction of state governmental action
in Pennsylvania, the taxpayer must show that the challenged action involves a wrongful
expenditure of tax monies or the wasting of government assets. He need not show that he
has a special interest in the suit that is distinct from other members of the public, or that he
will be injured in any way other than as a taxpayer. It has been held, however, that the
taxpayer must show some pecuniary loss to himself as a taxpayer to have standing; in the
proper circumstances, he will need to show that he is a taxpayer into the particular fund from
which monies will be expended for the challenged action. See generally Price v. Philadelphia
Parking Authority, 422 Pa. 317, 221 A.2d 138 (1966); Mayer v. Hemphill, 411 Pa. 1, 190 A.2d
444 (1963); Loewen v. Shapiro, 389 Pa. 610, 133 A.2d 525 (1957); Regan v. Stoddard, 361 Pa.
469, 65 A.2d 240 (1949); Schlanger v. West Berwick Borough, 261 Pa. 605, 104 A. 764 (1918);
Altemose v. Higher Educ. Facilities Authority, 7 Pa. Commw. 596, 300 A.2d 827 (1973). If
the challenged action is the granting of a tax exemption, or the removing of property from
the tax roles, he will need to show that he pays taxes into the fund from which that property
would pay if not exempt, thereby showing that his tax burden is increased. Price v. Philadel-
phia Parking Authority, supra at 325-26, 221 A.2d at 143. See Pennsylvania Gas & Water Co.
v. Kassab, 14 Pa. Commw. 564, 322 A.2d 775 (1974). This action was in the nature of a
taxpayer's suit, by a water company and its customers, to restrain the Pennsylvania Secretary
of Transportation from undertaking to relocate, grade, reconstruct and widen a highway. The
project was to be accomplished by the use of funds from the Motor License Fund, to which
the company had contributed by the payment of title and registration fees, and fuel taxes.
The company claimed that the project would violate its rights under article I, § 27 of the
Pennsylvania constitution in that it would cause runoff of earth, soils and other impurities
into the company's reservoir which would pollute it and reduce its capacity. Compare Vance
v. Kassab, 325 A.2d 924 (Pa. Commw. 1974), where, in a similar suit by an individual
claiming environmental damage to his property, the court said that plaintiff's exclusive
remedy was resort to the procedures of the Eminent Domain Code, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 26, § §
1-101 to -903 (Supp. 1974). The court distinguished this case from Pennsylvania Gas & Water
Co. v. Kassab, supra, first, on the basis that the customers of the water company had no
remedy under the Eminent Domain Code, and, second, as a matter of degree-damage to a
large sector of public as opposed to damage to individual property.
63. Price v. Philadelphia Parking Authority, 422 Pa. 317, 327 n.15, 221 A.2d 138, 144 n.15
(1966). The court went on to say:
Our conclusion is reinforced by a recognition of the need to subject the activities of
public authorities to judicial scrutiny. As public bodies, they exercise public powers
and must act strictly within their legislative mandates. Moreover, they stand in a
fiduciary relationship to the public which they are created to serve and their conduct
must be guided by good faith and sound judgment. . . . The mushrooming of authori-
ties at all levels of government and the frequent complaint that such bodies act in an
arbitrary and capricious manner in violation of existing law dictate that a check rein
be kept upon them. . . . These considerations dictate that the independence of au-
thorities from some of the usual restrictions on governmental activities not be extended
so as to insulate them from judicial scrutiny through the medium of taxpayers' suits.
Id. at 329, 221 A.2d at 145 (citations and footnotes omitted).
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in natural resources management is to afford a democratization of
government processes relating thereto. 4 The trust theory can pro-
vide a means for insuring that administrative agencies and public
authorities are held more accountable to the public they serve. 5 The
taxpayer's suit seems to be a natural tool for this purpose, and a suit
in the nature of a taxpayer's suit, therefore, should be available
where resources, rather than tax dollars, are being wasted or ille-
gally used.
Standing to challenge a government project on the basis that the
requirements of the public trust doctrine have not been met may
also be accorded to one whose property is being condemned for that
project. This is accomplished by raising a preliminary objection to
the declaration of taking.6 The preliminary objection may raise not
only matters pertaining to the specific property being condemned,
but if the property is to be used as part of a larger project, the
challenge may be based on the illegality of the project as a whole. 7
Failure to consider adequately the relevant environmental factors
may be considered such an illegality.
Where a citizen seeks to challenge the grant of a permit or license
by an administrative agency to a private individual, the problem of
standing becomes most significant. A suit to enjoin the Public Util-
ity Commission from issuing a certificate of public convenience, for
instance, raises the typical problems in this area. A state statute
requires that before such a certificate shall be issued, the Com-
mission shall hold public hearings." In order to challenge the deci-
sion of the Commission, the challenging party must show that he
64. Sax, supra note 14, at 561.
65. Id. at 495.
66. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 26, § 1-406 (1974). See generally Eminent Domain Code, PA. STAT.
ANN. tit. 26, §§ 1-101 to -903 (Supp. 1974). The preliminary objection to the declaration of
taking has been held to be the exclusive remedy to attack the lawfulness and propriety of a
condemnation proceeding. Valley Forge Golf Club v. Upper Merion Township, 422 Pa. 227,
221 A.2d 292 (1966); Hanni Appeal, 420 Pa. 289, 216 A.2d 774 (1966); Faranda Appeal, 420
Pa. 295, 216 A.2d 769 (1966); Mahon v. Lower Merion Township, 418 Pa. 558, 212 A.2d 217
(1965).
67. See, e.g., Washington Park, Inc. Appeal, 425 Pa. 349, 229 A.2d 1 (1967).
68. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 66, § 1123 (1959). This requires that a certificate of public conveni-
ence shall be granted:
[O]nly if and when the commission shall find or determine that the granting of such
certificate is necessary or proper for the service, accommodation, convenience, or safety
of the public . ...
Id. § 1123(a). Subsection (b) provides:
For the purpose of enabling the commission to make such finding or determination,
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was a "party to the proceedings affected thereby.""9 In such cases
users of the utility have been made formal parties to the proceed-
ings, and have been held to have sufficient interest to appeal orders
of the Commission on matters affecting service.7" Similarly, as to
matters affecting the environment or the allocation of public natu-
ral resources, it would seem that any citizen, as beneficiary of the
public trust, would have sufficient interest in the matter to become
a party or to take an appeal.7 Where the Constitution of Pennsyl-
vania establishes rights in the people, and those rights are threat-
ened, the people have a significant interest in the matter.
A basic question which is thus far unanswered by the courts, is
whether the people, as beneficiaries of the trust, have a right, qua
beneficiaries, to sue to enforce their constitutional equitable rights
in the res. Under the common law public trust, the rights to use the
corpus were enforceable in equity. It has been suggested that the
it shall hold such hearings, which shall be public, . . . as it may deem necessary or
proper in enabling it to reach a finding or determination.
Id. § 1123(b).
69. Id. § 1431. Generally, one becomes a party to the proceedings by filing a formal protest
prior to the hearing and by testifying at the hearing. Id. § 1391. However, "party to the
proceedings" is not defined in the statute.
Every person who files a protest in a proceeding pending before the Commission, and
who is given an opportunity to testify, is not ipso facto a party to the proceedings with
a right to maintain an appeal from the Commission's order.
Arsenal Bd. of Trade v. Public Util. Comm'n, 166 Pa. Super. 548, 551-52, 72 A.2d 612, 614
(1950). See also State Bd. of Undertakers v. Joseph T. Sekula Funeral Homes, Inc., 339 Pa.
309, 14 A.2d 308 (1940); Seitz Liquor License Case, 157 Pa. Super. 553, 43 A.2d 547 (1945).
In order to show that he was affected by the proceedings, the challenging party must show
that he had an interest that was adversely affected; it must be a direct interest in the subject
matter, and it must be immediate, pecuniary, and substantial (although in some cases, these
formal requirements have been somewhat relaxed, such as in the instance where users of the
utility are challenging a decision affecting service). See, e.g., Smith v. Public Util. Comm'n,
174 Pa. Super. 252, 101 A.2d 435 (1953); Arsenal Bd. of Trade v. Public Util. Comm'n, 166
Pa. Super. 548, 72 A.2d 612 (1940); Dutchland Tours, Inc. v. Public Util. Comm'n, 13 Pa.
Commw. 54, 318 A.2d 394 (1974).
70. See, e.g., Rydal-Meadowbrook Ass'n v. Public Util. Comm'n, 173 Pa. Super. 380, 98
A.2d 481 (1953); Commuter's Comm. v. Public Util. Comm'n, 170 Pa. Super. 596, 88 A.2d
(1952).
71. See, e.g., Bucks County Bd. of Comm'rs v. Public Util. Comm'n, 11 Pa. Commw. 487,
313 A.2d 185 (1973). The suit involved the issuance of a certificate of public convenience
authorizing a carrier to construct a pipeline for the transportation of petroleum products for
use by an electricity generating facility. Without much discussion of the issue of standing,
the court heard the appeal taken by: Board of County Commissioners, Bucks County; Bucks
County Planning Commission; Montgomery County Board of Commissioners; Montgomery
County Planning Commission; Trustees of Reading Railroad; an ad hoc citizens committee;
a regional environmental protection committee; and one individual.
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right of the people to have the res preserved and maintained under
the constitutional public trust should be similarly enforced."
As a final consideration, if the public trust is thought of as a
special type of charitable trust, to allow the public to sue to compel
performance of the duties of the trustee would be contrary to the
general rule. Such a suit, in the case of an ordinary charitable trust,
may be brought only by the Attorney General, as representative of
the people, parens patriae.3 A departure from that general rule
would seem to be warranted in this area, however, since the Com-
monwealth is the trustee of the natural resources, and the Attorney
General is the trustee's chief counsel. To hold that the Attorney
General is the only party who may seek to enforce the terms of the
trust, would be to hold, in effect, that only the trustee could ques-
tion its own performance. 7
I. SOME PRACTICAL PROBLEMS POSED BY THE TRUSTS
The common law and constitutional public trust doctrines have
been held to preclude the trustee both from using the res itself, and
from granting to others the right to use the res in such a way that
the equitable rights of the beneficiaries would be violated. While it
is thus an established concept that notwithstanding the trust the
Commonwealth may, in certain situations grant permits and licen-
ses,75 the limits and guidelines of this concept are as yet unclear.
Therefore, some hypothetical examples may be helpful in analyzing
a few of the issues involved in such situations.
Assume that Blackpark Wildlife Preserve is a Pennsylvania-
owned parkland which requires a delicate ecological balance to
maintain its use as a wildlife sanctuary.
Example 1. The Pennsylvania Department of Transportation pro-
72. See Fox Appeal, No. 73-078-B at 34 (Pa. Environmental Hearing Bd. May 16, 1974);
Howard, State Constitutions and the Environment, 58 VA. L. REv. 193, 224-29 (1972).
73. See, e.g., Pruner Estate, 390 Pa. 529, 136 A.2d 107 (1957); Curry Appeal, 390 Pa. 105,
134 A.2d 497 (1957); Wiegand v. Barnes Foundation, 374 Pa. 149, 97 A.2d 96 (1953). If a
beneficiary of a charitable trust has some special financial interest in the trust, which is more
than that interest which is generally held by the public, he may maintain a suit to enforce
that right. The general beneficiaries, however, have no power of enforcement. There are two
exceptions to this general rule; a member of the corporate trustee may sue to enforce the trust;
and the rule is not applicable to suits for cy pres, in accordance with The Estates Act of 1947,
PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 20, § 301.10 (1950). See Wiegand v. Barnes Foundation, supra.
74. Fox Appeal, No. 73-078-B at 4 (Pa. Environmental Hearing Bd. May 16, 1974).
75. Id.
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poses the construction of a highway through Blackpark which will
upset the ecological balance of the park to such an extent that its
value as a wildlife sanctuary will be destroyed. The court is asked
to enjoin construction.
Example 2. X, a developer, proposes to build a resort community
on Whiteacre, a large tract of land adjacent to Blackpark. Black-
park lies between Whiteacre and an interstate highway, and X seeks
to obtain a right-of-way through the park to serve as a main en-
trance to the resort. The proposed roadway would cause similar
damage to Blackpark as would the highway in Example 1. The
right-of-way is granted, and the court is asked to intervene.
The first example describes a situation that is almost identical to
that which arose in Payne v. Kassab." The Commonwealth, in de-
ciding whether to construct this highway, is bound by its duties as
trustee since Blackpark is a public natural resource, and the deci-
sion to build will adversely affect the environment and ecology of
that resource. The court should apply the Payne standard to review
the actions of the trustee," and upon the facts of this example,
might reasonably find a violation of the trust under each of the three
parts of that test.
In the second example, the Commonwealth is granting a right to
a private individual to build a road, an act which if done by the
Commonwealth itself, would violate the trust. In making such a
decision, the trustee should be held to at least as strict a standard
as when its own actions affect the res. In reviewing this decision, the
court should again apply the Payne standard of review, and issue
the requested injunction.
Example 3. X, again proposing to develop Whiteacre as a resort
community, applies for a permit to dump water from a sewage treat-
ment plant into a stream which is on the boundary of Blackpark and
Whiteacre. If the permit is issued, the water will become polluted
to such an extent that serious ecological damage to Blackpark will
result. The permit is issued, and the court is asked to intervene.
Example 4. Same facts as Example 3, except X proposes to use a
treatment plant that will purify the water to such a degree that no
pollution of the stream will result. By building this treatment plant
and disposing of the water into this stream on Blackpark, X will be
able to service the planned resort community. However, it is shown
76. 11 Pa. Commw. 14, 312 A.2d 86 (1973).
77. See text accompanying note 45 supra.
1975
Duquesne Law Review
that development of Whiteacre as proposed will cause drastic ecol-
ogical changes to the entire watershed of which Blackpark and
Whiteacre are parts, rendering Blackpark unsuitable for use as a
wildlife preserve. The agency involved decides to issue the permit
and the court is asked to intervene.
Example 5. Y owns Greenacre, a tract of land adjacent to Black-
park. Y proposed to construct a lumber mill and to use the timber
on Greenacre to supply its needs. The use of Greenacre for this
purpose will cause serious and substantial environmental damage to
Blackpark. In order to build the mill, Y must obtain permits from
the Department of Labor and Industry. Y is in compliance with all
applicable codes and ordinances relating to the proposed construc-
tion. The Department decides to issue the permits and the court is
asked to intervene.
In the third example, the stream, as well as Blackpark, is a public
natural resource and as such is part of the res. By issuing the permit,
the Commonwealth is allowing X to dump water under such condi-
tions that it will result in direct environmental damage to the
stream. The Environmental Hearing Board has held that, in grant-
ing permits of this type, the Commonwealth is bound by its duties
as trustee to consider the environmental implications of such deci-
sions.7" If this position is adopted by the courts, the Payne test
should apply here to determine the scope of judicial review.
In the fourth example, the Commonwealth is also granting a right
to dump water into the stream. The distinction from the third ex-
ample, however, is that the resulting environmental damage will not
be caused directly by the water, but by the development made
possible by the issuance of the permit. Any environmental damage
(e.g., silting of the stream) which would occur could be thought of,
then, as an indirect result of the granting of the permit.79 The issue
thus raised is the extent to which the Commonwealth, in issuing
permits to use the res, must consider their indirect effects upon the
environment. The corollary to this is presented in the fifth example,
where the permit granted did not give access to a portion of the res
at all. Rather, it represents an exercise of the general police power
78. Fox Appeal, No. 73-078-B at 7 (Pa. Environmental Hearing Bd. May 16, 1974).
79. Another situation where environmental damage could be thought of as an indirect
result of a permit would be where the damage was not to the stream at all, but to a related
resource. These examples are not intended to suggest answers to the problem of when an effect
is direct or indirect; rather, they assume directness or indirectness, and illustrate that such
a determination may have implications for the administration of the trust.
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for the public welfare. The issue raised here involves the extent to
which the Commonwealth, in issuing permits unrelated to the pub-
lic natural resources or environmental protection, must consider the
effects of the permit upon the res.
One approach to these issues would be to apply a two-step analy-
sis. The first step would be to determine whether the granting of the
permit constituted the granting of the right to use the res. If not,
the Commonwealth would merely have been exercising its general
police powers to regulate the use of land, and would not have been
bound by its duties as trustee. If, on the other hand, the permit
constituted a granting of the right to use the res, the Common-
wealth, acting as trustee, would have been bound to consider all the
environmental factors involved, direct and indirect, before reaching
a determination.
Applying this analysis to the fourth example, the Commonwealth
should have considered the environmental impact of its decision
upon Blackpark, and failure to do so would constitute a breach of
its obligations as trustee. In the fifth example, the issuance of the
Labor and Industry permit did not involve a situation where the
Commonwealth was acting as trustee, and therefore it was not
bound to consider the environmental effects of such a grant. If the
issuance of the permit is to be enjoined, it must be on the basis of
some statute or regulation.8 1
IV. CONCLUSION
At a time when the energy crisis has created mounting pressure
to lessen environmental controls, the constitutional public trust
doctrine should take on added significance; constitutionally man-
dated safeguards ought not to be cast aside with ease. The imple-
mentation of this trust, however, remains somewhat in doubt. There
are many issues concerning the doctrine which must be resolved by
the courts8 or the legislature. Foremost among such questions is
80. This is not to suggest that a department such as the Department of Labor and Indus-
try could not choose to consider environmental factors, but merely, that in such a situation,
it is not bound by the public trust doctrine.
81. One issue which has not been dealt with by the courts is the extent to which, in
deciding appeals from administrative decisions, the court must exercise independent judg-
ment as to law and facts when constitutional questions are involved. In cases involving the
United States Constitution, this question has arisen from time to time. See Larson, The
Doctrine of "Constitutional Fact," 15 TEMP. L.Q. 185 (1941). Ohio Valley Water Co. v. Ben
Avon Borough, 253 U.S. 287 (1920), held that when dealing with appeals from administrative
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what role the legislature, the executive (acting through administra-
tive agencies), the courts, and private citizens will play in the ad-
ministration of the constitutional trust? Additionally, the limits of
the trust's enforcement powers are as yet undefined. Within this
realm, it is important that the requirements of the constitutional
mandate be construed to be flexible; the doctrine should act as a
fluid check against decisions which would ignore important aspects
of environmental protection.
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bodies which involve constitutional questions, a reviewing court is required to exercise inde-
pendent judgment as to law and facts.
It is doubtful whether Ben Avon, supra, is applicable here since the constitutional
issue here raised [is] not confiscation of property. Cf. Acker v. United States, 298 U.S.
426, 80 L. Ed. 1257 (1936). In any case, however, without overruling Ben Avon, the
United States Supreme Court has tended to ignore the Ben Avon doctrine in later cases
and has usually applied the substantial evidence rule to findings of fact made by
administrative agencies. See Permian Basin Area Rate Cases, 390 U.S. 747, 20 L. Ed.
2d 312 (1968) ....
Surrick v. Upper Providence Township Zoning Hearing Bd., 11 Pa. Commw. 607, 612, 314
A.2d 565, 567 (1974) (some citations omitted).
